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In the Supreme Court of the State of Idaho

BRITANIE BELL,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
V.

MICHAEL EAGY,
Defendant-Appellant.

)
)
)
)
)
)

RESPONDENT'S BRIEF
Supreme Court Docket No. 41639-2013
Ada County Case No. CV-DR-2011-12381

)
)
)
)

The above-named Plaintiff/Respondent, Britanie Bell, by and through her counsel of
record, Ron R. Shepherd of the law firm of R. Shepherd Law, PLLC, submits the following
Respondent's Brief.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Plaintiff-Respondent, Britanie Bell ("Bell"), and Defendant-Appellant, Michael Eagy
("Eagy"), conceived four daughters together but were never married. Clerk's Record on Appeal
p. 36, L. 1-4. In June 2011, Bell filed a Complaint to Establish Custody, Visitation and Child
Support. R. pp. 9-20. The paiiies ultimately came to terms on all issues regarding custody,
visitation and child support, and entered a stipulation that led to the entry of a Stipulated Decree
Establishing Custody, Visitation and Child Support ("Stipulated Decree"), which was entered on
April 10, 2012. R. pp. 35-44.
Paragraph 15 of the Stipulated Decree requires the parties to share work-related childcare
expenses with each party paying 50%. Specifically, the Stipulated Decree reads as follows:
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CHILDCARE: Any work related childcare expenses incun-ed for
the benefit of the minor children of the parties shall be divided
between the parties in propo1iion to their income, with the Plaintiff
paying 50% and the Defendant paying 50%. Each party shall
make direct payment to the childcare provider and hold the other
harmless from liability for such childcare charges in excess of the
other paiiy's share of such expenses. If either party fails to comply
with this provision, and the other party suffers financial loss or
other anangements for childcare have to be made as a result, then
supplemental contempt proceedings may be initiated and all court
costs and attorney fees thereby incurred shall be awarded to the
prevailing party in such enforcement proceedings.
R. pp. 42-43.
The Stipulated Decree awarded Bell with primary physical custody of the parties' four
minor children. R. p. 36 at
Bell was at work.

,r 3.

Bell was required to place the minor children in daycare while

R. pp. 51, 52, 54-61. No time prior to the contempt action filed in the

Magistrate Court did Eagy ever pay any work-related child care or medical cost to Bell or to the
respective child care or medical providers directly. R. pp. 50-51.
Bell requested Eagy to pay his pro rata portion of work-related child care on several
occasions but Eagy refused. R. pp. 50 at ,r 8, 54-61. After Bell incurred several thousand dollars
of work-related child care costs and medical expenses for the minor children and Eagy refused to
pay his share, Bell sought relief from the Court by filing a contempt action on January 31, 2013.
R. pp. 46-66.

Bell's contempt action sought both criminal and civil sanctions and a money

judgment for the amount due from Eagy to Bell. R. pp. 47-48.
On March 19, 2013, Eagy filed a motion for summary judgment seeking dismissal of the
contempt action. R. pp. 75-76. Eagy argued to the Magistrate Court that Bell had not sufficiently
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pled the elements of contempt. R. p. 84. Eagy's motion for summary judgment came on for
hearing on April 30, 2013. The Honorable Judge Day presided and entered his decision orally on
the record.

The Magistrate Court granted Eagy's motion for summary judgment and

subsequently entered an order dismissing the action. R. pp. 13 8-13 9. Bell timely filed a notice of
appeal in the District Court. R. pp. 140-143.
Both parties filed appellate briefs in the District Court appeal. R. pp. 146-158; 159-167.
Oral argument was held on October 10, 2013, and the District Court entered its Memorandum
Decision and Order on October 16, 2013. R. pp. 174-185. The District Court reversed in part
and affirmed in part the Magistrate Court's decision. Specifically, the District Court reversed the
Magistrate Court's decision that Bell had no remedy under the Stipulated Decree in the event
Eagy failed to pay his portion of the parties' childcare obligation. R. p. 179. The District Court
also reversed the Magistrate Court's decision that Bell could not, under any circumstances,
obtain a money judgment in the amount of child care costs owed under the Stipulated Decree.
R. pp. 182-184. The District Court affirmed the Magistrate Court's decision related to Bell's
contempt action for Eagy's failure to pay his share of medical expenses incuned for the benefit
of the parties' minor children. R. p. 136. Bell did not file a cross-appeal to challenge the District
Court's decision on this issue. Additionally, the issue of medical expense reimbursement is moot
because (1) after the contempt action was filed, Eagy paid the amount owed for medical
reimbursement; and (2) the paiiies have stipulated to a modified decree that changed the
language related to reimbursement for medical expenses. As such, Bell will not address the issue
of medical reimbursement fmiher.
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Left at issue in this case is whether Eagy may be held responsible through contempt
proceedings for his failure to pay his share of work-related child care expenses, totaling the
amount of $2,084.00 over an eight-month period (R. p. 50), pursuant to the Stipulated Decree to
which Eagy agreed. R. pp. 35-44.

ISSUES PRESENTED
Eagy has failed to clearly state the issues presented, as required under Idaho Appellate
Rule 35(a)(4). Bell, therefore, presents the following additional or other issues presented as
contemplated under I.A.R. 35(b)(4).
1.
Whether Eagy has waived his claim that the District Court erred where he failed
to state in his brief the issue presented on appeal in short and concise terms, as required under
I.A.R. 35(a)(4).
2.
Whether Eagy waived appellate review of any alleged errors made by the District
Court where (a) Eagy has failed to suppo11 his legal arguments with statutory or case law
authority; (b) Eagy has failed to cite this Court to support in the record for his allegations of fact
made in his brief; and (c) Eagy has failed to include in the record a transcript of a hearing held in
the magistrate court upon which Eagy heavily relies in his argument.
3.
Whether the District Court's decision should be affirmed where Eagy has failed to
affirmatively show errors allegedly made by the District Court.
4.

Whether Bell is entitled to an award of costs and attorney fees on appeal.

STANDARD OF REVIEW
For nearly two decades the Idaho Supreme Court has repeated that, when this Court is
reviewing a decision of the district comt acting in its appellate capacity, this Comt will review
the record and the magistrate court's decision independently of, but with due regard for, the
district court's decision. See Losser v. Bradstreet, 145 Idaho 670, 672, 183 P.3d 758, 760, (2008)
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(citing Carter v. Carter, 143 Idaho 373, 378, 146 P.3d 639, 644 (2006)).

This standard,

however, has been clarified. The Losser Court stated as follows regarding this standard:
Thus, for nearly two decades, we have effectively ignored the
structure of our appellate rules and issued opinions in which we
have directly addressed the decision of the magistrate. Indeed, we
have done so recently. See Barmore v. Perrone, 145 Idaho 340,
179 P.3d 303 (2008), 2008 Ida. LEXIS 25, 2008 WL 400347 (Feb.
15, 2008) (vacating the magistrate comi's grant of partial summary
judgment). We have determined that this practice represents an
erroneous conflation of our standard of appellate review with the
structure of our appellate rules. In this decision, and henceforth,
our decisions will reflect our application of the Idaho Appellate
Rules.

Id.
Losser and its progeny make it clear that it is no longer proper for the Supreme Court to
review magistrate court decisions directly, effectively bypassing the district court's intermediate
review of the magistrate court's decision. When the Supreme Comi or Court of Appeals is
reviewing a district comi's decision rendered in its appellate capacity, the Supreme Court or
Court of Appeals is to review the district court's decision and affirm or reverse such a decision
rather than reviewing the magistrate court's decision directly. See State v. Doe, 322 P.3d 976,
977-978, 2014 WL 527211 (Idaho 2014); Bailey v. Bailey, 153 Idaho 526, 529, 284 P.3d 970,
973 (2012) (holding that this Court does not review the magistrate comi's decision where it is
reviewing a district court's decision made in its inte1mediate appellate capacity); State v. Korn,
148 Idaho 413,415, 224 P.3d 480,482 n.l (2009) ("[The Supreme Court is] procedurally bound
to affirm or reverse the decisions of the district comi.").
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In his opening brief, Eagy misstates the legal standard to be applied in this appeal as did
the appellant in Korn, supra. 148 Idaho at 415, 224 P.3d at 482, n.1. As a result, Eagy has
predominantly focused his argument on the decision of the Magistrate Court rather than on the
decision of the District Court, an error that is fatal to Eagy's appeal.
ARGUMENT
1.

Eagy Waived Any Claim That The District Court Erred By Failing To Provide A
Short And Concise Statement Of The Issues Presented On Appeal As Required
Under I.A.R. 35(a)(4).
I.A.R. 35(a)(4) states that the appellant's brief "shall contain", among other things, "a list

of the issues presented on appeal, expressed in terms and circumstances of the case but without
unnecessary detail." The rule further states that the statement should be "short and concise, and
should not be repetitious." This rule has been interpreted to mean "that an appellant must
identify specific issues to be presented on appeal and present suppo1iing argument with citations
to the authorities, statutes and parts of the transcript and record upon which he relies." Drake v.

Craven, 105 Idaho 734, 736, 672 P.2d 1064, 1066 (Ct. App. 1983) (citing Cox v. Mountain
Vistas, Inc., 102 Idaho 714, 719 (footnote 4), 639 P.2d 12, 17 (1981)).
In Drake, the appellant attempted to state an issue on appeal, but the Court found it was
nothing more than an invitation for the Court to search the record for error, an invitation the
Comi has repeatedly refused to do. See id; see also, State v. Crawford, l 04 Idaho 840, 841, 663
P.2d 1142, 1143 (Ct. App. 1983) ("the appellate rules require that an appellant identify the
specific issues to be considered on appeal and present argument with citations to the authorities,
statutes and parts of the transcript and record upon which the appellant relies . . . . It is implicit
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in Rule 35 and in Smoot [99 Idaho 855, 590 P.2d 1001 (1978)] that we will not search a trial
record for unspecified errors.") "Assertions of error which are not supported by argument or
authorities cannot be considered on appeal." Cratt1ord, l 04 Idaho at 841, 663 P .2d at 1143
(citing State v. Smoot, 99 Idaho 855,590 P.2d 1001 (1978)).
Eagy' s brief does not provide anything that could reasonably be construed as a short and
concise statement of the issues presented.

Additionally, Eagy's brief does not contain a

"division" or "appropriate heading" to help identify the list of issues presented, as required under
I.A.R. 35(a).
Because Eagy has failed to comply with I.A.R. 35(a)(4), Bell and this Court are left
having to comb through Eagy' s opening brief to try to discern what error( s) Eagy contends was
made by the lower court. The problem is compounded because Eagy is apparently operating
under the incorrect legal standard. Eagy's opening brief clearly focuses on the decision of the
Magistrate Court and makes almost no mention of the decisions made by the District Comi. Bell
simply cannot identify what error(s) Eagy contends were made by the District Court. As such,
Bell cannot properly respond.
This same problem existed in Korn. The appellant in Korn misstated the standard of
review where the Supreme Court was reviewing an intermediate appeal to the district court. As a
result, the appellant in that case identified only the decisions of the magistrate court, rather than
those of the district court, as issues on appeal. See Korn, 148 Idaho at 415, 224 P.3d at 482, n.1.
The Korn Court stated that under such circumstances, I.A.R. 35(a)(4), provides that the appellant
waives any claim that the district court erred. See id, (citing State v. Prestwich, 116 Idaho 959,
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961, 783 P .2d 298, 300 (1989), overruled on other grounds by State v. Guzman, 122 Idaho 981,
842 P.2d 660 (1992)). The Korn Court recognized that this presents a problem because, under
Losser, the Supreme Court is procedurally bound to affirm or reverse the decisions of the district
court only. See id.
In short, Eagy provides no short and concise statement of issues presented. To the extent
one can discern the issues presented on appeal, they are issues with the Magistrate Court, not the
District Court. As such, Eagy has waived any claim of en-or made by the District Court. This
Court must therefore affirm the District Court's decision.
2.

Eagy Waived Any Claim That The District Court Erred By Failing To Cite The
Court To Authorities Statutes Or Parts Of The Transcript And Record Relied
Upon, As Required Under I.A.R. 35(a)(6).
I.A.R. 35(a)(6) requires the appellant's brief to include an argument section that "shall

contain the contentions of the appellant with respect to the issues presented on appeal, the
reasons therefor, with citations to the authorities, statutes and parts of the transcript and record
relied upon."
The appellant has the responsibility to include exhibits and transcripts of hearings in the
record before the appellate court. See Student Loan Fund v. Duerner, 131 Idaho 45, 54, 951 P.2d
1272, 1281 (1997) (citing Jones v. Jones, 117 Idaho 621,625,790 P.2d 914,918 (1990). When
the record on appeal does not contain the evidence taken into account by the district court, the
Supreme Court "must necessarily presume that the evidence justifies the decision and that the
findings are supported by substantial evidence." Id. (quoting Nash v. Hope Silver Lead Mines,
79 Idaho 137,142,314 P.2d 681,683 (1957)).
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Eagy' s opening brief makes many bald assertions of fact and attempts to paraphrase what
the Magistrate Court stated in its decision. Eagy does not, however, cite this Court to the record
for suppo1i of such factual assertions.

To be sure, Bell contends that many of such factual

assertions are subject to dispute, but because the Magistrate Court disposed of this case on
summary judgment, Bell has been deprived of her right to a trial to address these factual issues.
The Court should disregard all factual assertions made in Eagy's opening brief that are not
specifically cited in the record.
Additionally, Eagy has failed to request the transcript of the summary judgment hearing
held in the Magistrate Court on April 30, 2013. Eagy is responsible to make sure that everything
Eagy intends to rely on in support of his argument is in this Court's record. Because Eagy has
failed to request the transcript of such hearing, this Court should disregard any reference Eagy
makes to what "Judge Day" or the Magistrate Court said because this Court's record does not
contain the Magistrate Court's transcript.

In summary, Eagy has not met his burden to (1) include in the record the necessary
transcripts to support his argument; and (2) cite this Court to authority, statute and the record for
support of Eagy' s argument. The presumption is that, absent an affirmative showing, the District
Comi did not e1T. Eagy has failed to meet his burden to affirmatively show that the District
Comi eITed. The District Court's decision should therefore be affirmed.
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3.

The District Court Correctly Stated The Law And Applied The Law, So Its Decision
Should Be Affirmed.
Because Eagy has failed to identify specific errors the District Court allegedly made, Bell

is not in a position to respond accordingly.

1

It appears Eagy has by and large cut and pasted the

arguments he made in his Memorandum in Support of Summary Judgment (R. pp. 85-86) into
his appellate brief (Appellant's Opening Brief pp. 10-12). To the extent the Court feels obligated
to comb the record to find an error, or is able to discern the issues Eagy raises with the District
Court's decision, Bell refers this Comito the argument and authority in Bell's Memorandum in
Opposition to Motion for Summary Judgment (R pp. 91-99) as it provides a comprehensive
response to the same arguments raised in Eagy's opening brief.
Bell agrees with the District Court's legal analysis as it relates to the parties' obligation to
pay work-related child care expenses, and agrees with the District Court's interpretation of the
Stipulated Decree. Eagy has failed to identify any err of the District Court and no e1TOr should
be presumed. As such, the District Comi's decision should be affirmed.

4.

Bell Is Entitled To An Award Of Costs And Attorney Fees Incurred In This Appeal.
Bell is entitled to an award of costs under I.R.C.P. 54(d) and I.A.R. 40, Idaho Code

§ 7-610 and the Stipulated Decree entered in this matter. Bell is likewise entitled to an award of

Bell had a similar problem responding to Eagy's motion for summary judgment filed in the Magistrate
Court because it was unclear what Eagy was arguing in support of summary judgment. See Memorandum
in Opposition to Motion for Summary Judgment, p. 3, R. p. 93. In this appeal Eagy simply cut and pasted
almost the same argument, adding only a couple of paragraphs, which do not find any support in the
record. Eagy's lack of clarity in what he is arguing makes it very difficult for Bell to respond clearly and
concisely to Eagy's issues.
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attorney fees incurred in this appeal under the Stipulated Decree at il 15; I.A.R. 41; I.R.C.P. 54(e)
and 75(m); Idaho Code§§ 7-610 and 12-121.
A.

The Stipulated Decree Requires That Bell Be Awarded Costs And Fees If She
Prevails In This Appeal.

The Stipulated Decree entered in this matter provides a specific attorney fee provision
applicable in this case. More specifically, the paragraph of the Stipulated Decree that addresses
child care expenses states, "If either paiiy fails to comply with this provision, and the other paiiy
suffers financial loss or other arrangements for childcare have to be made as a result, then
supplemental contempt proceedings may be initiated and all comi costs and attorney fees thereby
incurred shall be awarded to the prevailing party in such enforcement proceedings."
R. pp. 42-43. This appeal is part and parcel of an "enforcement proceedings" to enforce Eagy's
obligation to pay his share of child care costs. As such, the mandatory language used above
requires that Eagy pay Bell's attorney fees incurred in this appeal if Bell prevails.
B.

Idaho Code § 7-610 and I.R.C.P. 75(m) Authorize An Award Of Attorney
Fees To Bell On Appeal.

Idaho Code § 7-610 provides that in a contempt proceeding, "the court in its discretion,
may award attorney's fees and costs to the prevailing paiiy." I.R.C.P. 75(m) states that "[i]n any
contempt proceeding, the court may award the prevailing party costs and reasonable attorney
fees under Idaho Code§ 7-610."
This appeal stems from the dismissal of a non-summary contempt action filed by Bell
against Eagy, and the District Court's subsequent reversal of such dismissal. R. pp. 138-140;
174-185. As such, Idaho Code § 7-610 and I.R.C.P. 75(m) squarely apply to this case, and
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authorize this Com1 to award the prevailing pmiy attorney fees and costs.

The amount in

controversy is relatively small, and Eagy has failed to support his appeal with authority or an
adequate record. The Com1 should therefore exercise its discretion and award Bell her costs and
attorney fees under this statute to the extent Bell prevails in this appeal.
C.

Attorney Fees Are Also Warranted Under Idaho Code§ 12-121.

Idaho Code§ 12-121 allows the Comito award attorney fees to the prevailing pm1y if the
Court finds that the appeal was brought or pursued frivolously, unreasonably or without
foundation.

I.R.C.P. 54(e)(l). The Supreme Court has also held that Idaho Code § 12-121

"allows the award of attorney fees in a civil action if the appeal merely invites the Court to
second guess the findings of the lower com1." Bach v. Bagley, 148 Idaho 784, 797, 229 P.3d
1146, 1159 (2010); Turner v. Turner, 155 Idaho 819, 827, 317 P.3d 716, 724 (2013); Etcheverry

Sheep Co. v. JR. Simplot Co., 113 Idaho 15, 19, 740 P.2d 57, 61, (1987); Booth v. Weiser
Irrigation Dist., 112 Idaho 684, 735 P.2d 995 (1987). In Bach, the Court awarded the respondent
attorney fees under Idaho Code § 12-121 reasoning that the appellant had provided no argument
or authority on which reversal of the district court could be based and was merely asking the
Supreme Comito second guess the district court's decision.
When an appellant fails to present a cogent argument as to why he should prevail, an
award to his opponent is appropriate. See Turner v. Turner, 155 Idaho 819,827,317 P.3d 716,
724 (2013) (citing Chicoine v. Bignall, 127 Idaho 225,228,899 P.2d 438,441 (1995)).
Failure to follow the established appellate rules may justify an award of attorney fees on
appeal.

See Jensen v. Doherty, IOI Idaho 910,911,623 P.2d 1287, 1288 (1981) (citing
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I.A.R. 41; LC. § 12-121; Minich v. Gem State Developers, Inc., 99 Idaho 911, 591 P.2d 1078
(1979)).
Eagy has failed to follow the appellate rules, which makes it exponentially more difficult
for Bell to figure out the best way to respond to the present appeal. It also makes it difficult for
the Comito identify and analyze the issues.
Additionally, Eagy has merely asked this Court to second guess the District Court by
essentially affirming the Magistrate Court without regard to the decision of the District Comi.
The best evidence of Eagy's request for this Court to second guess the lower court is that Eagy
has literally cut and pasted his arguments from his Memorandum in Support of Motion for
Summary Judgment into his opening brief.

Cf R. pp. 85-86; Appellant's Opening Brief,

pp. 10-12. Assuming, arguendo, it is proper for this Court to bypass the District Comi decision
and analyze the Magistrate Court decision directly, Eagy has failed to meet his burden to request
a transcript of the pertinent Magistrate Comi hearing, effectively leaving this Comi blind as to
what the Magistrate Court decided.
Finally, Eagy has provided no new legal authority for his argument on appeal. The only
legal authority cited anywhere in Eagy's opening brief is under the heading standard of review,
and that legal authority is at best questionable and at worst completely overruled as shown by the
cases cited under the standard of review section of this brief.
For these reasons and more, Bell is entitled to an award of attorney fees on appeal under
Idaho Code § 12-121.
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CONCLUSION

Based upon the foregoing and the record before the Comi, Bell respectfully requests that
the Court affirm the District Comi's decision and award Bell her costs and attorney fees incuned
in this appeal.
DATED this

~

JO ~ay ofJuly, 2014
R. SHEPHERD LAW, PLLC

[ ~

Attorneys for Plaintiff-Respondent, Britanie Bell
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identified below, and two (2) true and correct copies of the foregoing RESPONDENT'S BRIEF
to be served by mail and addressed to the following:
John A. Miller
MILLER & HARR
3363 North Lakeharbor Lane
Boise, ID 83703

(,/) U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid
( ) Certified Mail/Return Receipt
( ) Hand Delivered
(Y ) Facsimile 3 31-6618
(,/) Email: johnmiller@millerharr.com
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